 Instances of subjective experience |
In philosophy of mind, qualia (/ˈkwɑː.li.ə, ˈkweɪ.-/; singular: quale /-.li, -.leɪ/) are defined as instances of subjective experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in relation to a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple — this particular apple now".
This article is about the philosophical concept. For other uses, see Qualia (disambiguation).
Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, and the redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characteristics of sensations, qualia stand in contrast to propositional attitudes,1 where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what it is directly like to be experiencing.
C. S. Peirce introduced the term quale in philosophy in 1866, and in 1929 C. I. Lewis was the first to use the term "qualia" in its generally agreed-upon modern sense. later defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes". and suggested that was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".